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The Ethics of International Criminal 'Lawfare'  
Kirsten J. Fisher, University of Ottawa, Canada 
Cristina G. Stefan, University of Leeds, UK 
 
Abstract 
7KHWHUP³ODZIDUH´KDVEHHQXVHGWRUHIHUWRWKHXVHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOODZDVDWRRORI
war. Despite the expansive employment of the term to refer to appeals to law in ongoing conflict, 
WKLVDUWLFOHGHPRQVWUDWHVKRZ³ODZIDUH´KDVWDNHQRQQHJDWLYHPHDQLQJZLWKRXWHWKLFDO
justification. We argue that the co-opting of the term as a means of condemnation is unfair and 
potentially detrimental, and a more exacting definition and narrower use of the term are needed 
to avoid obfuscating potentially purposeful recourses to international criminal law. In looking at 
how international criminal lawfare has manifested with referrals to the ICC, it becomes clear that 
problems of negative perceptions lie not with lawfare itself, but with the intentional obstruction 
by parties interested in the outcome of a conflict. Tackling these negative perceptions also lays 
thHJURXQGZRUNIRUDQHFHVVDU\IXWXUHDUJXPHQWIRUWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶VPRUDO
responsibility to promote safeguards to ensure that the international criminal legal system is itself 
just. 
  
Keywords 
international criminal law; ethics; lawfare; International Criminal Court (ICC); war crimes 
 
1. Introduction 
 
,QWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOODZDQGWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW,&&RU³WKH&RXUW´VSHFLILFDOO\
exists at the intersection of law and politics. In just over a decade, the ICC has developed from a 
simple yet powerful idea to an international institution that boasts 123 states parties and is used by 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a tool in its arsenal for the maintenance of 
international peace and security and the promotion and protection of human rights globally. As an 
instrument of legal order, international criminal law (ICL) is meant to demonstrate objectivity and 
impartiality in its conclusions regarding justice and the commission of particular crimes. As an 
international institution, however, there is the potential for agents to attempt to use it for political 
and strategic gains. In more than one conflict globally, ICL has been used to garner advantage in 
2 
 
political and peace negotiations, to legitimize acts by explaining or justifying them in the language 
of ICL, or to invite outside parties to judge behaviours of war and perhaps even settle disputes. 
This intersection of law and politics in the international sphere introduces interesting moral 
questions about how criminal law ought to be used in the context of ongoing conflicts.  
This article questions specifically the ethics of appeals to international criminal law with 
the intention of influencing the outcome of a conflict. The first section of the article acknowledges 
the tradLWLRQRIXVLQJWKHWHUP³ODZIDUH´WRUHIHUWRWKHXVHRIODZLQFRQIOLFWEXWLQGRLQJVRPXVW
contend with the lack of consistent understanding or use of the term. With an etymology of 
³ODZIDUH´ DQG D GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH FXUUHQW LQWHOOHFWXDO GHEDWHV UHJDUGing what acts should be 
LQFOXGHGXQGHU³ODZIDUH´DVZHOODVZKHWKHUWKHODEHOQHFHVVDULO\VLJQDOVDQDEXVHRIODZWKHILUVW
section explores this lack of consensus on the definition. This indeterminate definition results in a 
lack of consensus with regard to the acts included within the category, and also, to whether the 
acts are inherently immoral or not. We explain our preference for a narrow definition of lawfare 
in the international criminal context, to speak to the appeal to ICL by parties who wish to influence 
the outcome of ongoing conflict. Once a definition of the term is settled, acknowledging the value 
of a label attached to specific appeals to ICL, we turn to the question of the morality of the use of 
international criminal lawfare. We argue that international criminal lawfare is, in fact, not 
LQKHUHQWO\LPPRUDODQGSURYLGHHWKLFDOUHDVRQLQJIRUWKHQHHGWRUHVFXHWKHWHUP³ODZIDUH´IURP
its largely negative connotations. Its current use obfuscates the possible purposeful use of criminal 
law in conflict and may act to deter those who would use it justly.  
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We argue that misunderstanding the connection between the use of lawfare and problems 
with the system as cause-and-effect can invite some unwelcome results, including the dissuasion 
of parties to conflict from appealing to ICL when appropriate, out of fear of being negatively 
perceived for doing so. We believe this rescuing exercise is important, given the potential of the 
term to meet a need in our vocabulary: a word that describes a particular appeal to law and which 
alerts us to the need to be watchful for potential misuse and attempts at interference. There is 
reason to be cautious of such appeals. However, such appeals should not be excluded from the 
international legal system, nor should they all be regarded as immoral and inappropriate. Finally, 
we argue that there is a corresponding moral responsibility borne by the international community 
to ensure that the ICL system is itself just, and to be resistant to attempts at manipulation and 
subverting the law. Lawfare in the international criminal legal system, under the right conditions, 
can be just and appropriate, and should be supported by members of the international community 
as a means of protecting and promoting human rights globally. 
 
 
2. $Q (W\PRORJ\ RI ³/DZIDUH´ DQG WKH 5KHWRULFDO 8VH RI WKH 7HUP LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Politics  
  
7KHWHUP³ODZIDUH´RULJLQDWHVIURPWKHZRUNRI-RKQ&DUOVRQDQG1HYLOOH<HRPDQVZKRUHIHUUHG
WRLWLQWKHLUDUJXPHQWUHJDUGLQJWKHPRYHPHQWDZD\IURPWKH³KXPDQLWDULDQ´FRPPXQLW\V\VWHPV
RIMXVWLFHUHVWRUDWLYHWRPRUH³XWLOLWDULDQ´V\VWHPVUHWULEXWLYHZKLFKDUHPRQRSROL]HGE\WKH
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state.1 Carlson and Yeomans lament that the search for truth and harmony of the restorative 
approaches are replaced by the adversarial and accusatory procedures of the courts and that 
³ODZIDUHUHSODFHVZDUIDUHDQGWKHGXHO LVZLWKZRUGVUDWKHUWKDQVZRUGV´2 What is interesting 
DERXWWKLVILUVWXVHRIWKHWHUP³ODZIDUH´LVWKDWLWSRLQWVWRWKHSRZHUDQGWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKHXVH
of a system of retributive justice. As the authors note, retributive processes are coercive, 
combative, and their effectiveness depends on the policies and actions of the power wielders.  
Twenty-four years later, the term was again used to convey the power of using law to win 
DYLFWRU\RYHURQH
VDGYHUVDU\,QWZRRIILFHUVRI&KLQD¶V3HRSOH¶V/LEHUDWLRQ$UP\4LDR
Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published a book entitled Unrestricted Warfare. In this work, the term 
³ODZIDUH´ ZDV XVHG QRW WR UHIHU WR UHWULEXWLYH or criminal justice at all, but rather in terms of 
µVHL]LQJWKHHDUOLHVWRSSRUWXQLW\WRVHWXSUHJXODWLRQV¶3LQDSODFHZKHUHµSROLWLFVKDVEHFRPHWKH
continuation ² or even just one of the manifestations ² RIZDU¶4 In this sense, the monopoly of 
law is viewed as just one of the different modalities with which one may be able to wage war. 
6LQFHWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI³ODZIDUH´LQWKHVHZRUNVWKHWHUPKDVEHHQSLFNHGXSDQGXVHGTXLWH
liberally to refer to a wide array of acts that combine the use or appeal to law within an adversarial 
context.  
                                                          
1
 John Carlson and Neville YeomanVµ:KLWKHU*RHWK7KH/DZ± +XPDQLW\RU%DUEDULW\¶
<http://www.laceweb.org.au/whi.htm>, 26 October 2015.  
2
 Ibid. 
3
 :RXWHU*:HUQHUµ7KH&XULRXV&DUHHURI/DZIDUH¶Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
(2010) 62-72, p. 64. 
4
 Ibid., p. 65.  
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 &KDUOHV-'XQODSEURXJKWWKHWHUP³ODZIDUH´WRWKHIRUHIURQWRIFRQWHPSRUDU\GLVFXVVLRQV
ZKHQLQKHGHILQHGLWDVµWKHXVHRIODZDVDZHDSRQLQZDU¶5 Dunlap changed his approach 
to lawfare over the years, partly in response to comments on his widely-circulated 2001 article, to 
IRFXV RQ WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLYH DVSHFWV RI ODZ DQG ZDU DQG µGHOLYHU ODZ WR VWUDWHJLF
LQVWUXPHQWDOL]DWLRQE\DOOSDUWLHVIRUWKHLURZQDGYDQWDJH¶6 7KHUHILQHGGHILQLWLRQIRFXVHVRQµWKH 
strategy of using ± or misusing ± law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an 
RSHUDWLRQDOREMHFWLYH¶7 For Dunlap, the use of lawfare is neither ethically good nor bad; like many 
tools of war, it is how it is used that attaches moral significance to its use. Many follow Dunlap's 
position and approach the concept of lawfare as morally neutral, that is, as the use of law with the 
intention of damaging an opponent, winning a public relations victory, or influencing the tactical 
decisions RIDQRSSRQHQW LQDQRQJRLQJFRQIOLFW'DYLG.HQQHG\GHVFULEHV WKHFRQFHSWDV µWKH
ZDJLQJRIZDUE\ODZ¶8 DQG5LFKDUG)DONVD\VLWFDQEHULJKWWRµFRQFHLYHRI³ODZIDUH´DV³VRIW
SRZHUJHRSROLWLFV´RUDVDIRUPRI³DV\PPHWULFZDUIDUH´ZDJHGE\SROLWLFDODctors deficient in 
                                                          
5
 Charles Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts 29 
November 2001, Carr Center for Human Rights,, Harvard University, Unpublished Paper,  
<http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf>, 2 October 2015. 
6
 7DZLD$QVDKµ/DZIDUH$5KHWRULFDO$QDO\VLV¶Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
(2010) 87-119, p. 110. 
7
 &KDUOHV-'XQODSµ/DZIDUH7RGD\$3HUVSHFWLYH¶Yale Journal of International Affairs (Winter 2008) 146-154, 
p. 146. 
8
 David Kennedy, Of War and Law, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006), p. 12. 
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KDUG SRZHU¶9 /DZIDUH XQGHUVWRRG LQ WKLV LGHRORJLFDOO\ QHXWUDO ZD\ LV µPXFK WKH VDPH DV D
ZHDSRQ¶10 in that it can be used for good or bad purposes.11 
OWKHUV KRZHYHU HPSKDVL]H RQO\ WKH QHJDWLYH FRQQRWDWLRQ RI WKH WHUP ³ODZIDUH´ E\
VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW LW LV D µVWUDWHJ\ RI WKH ZHDN XVLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO IRUD MXGLFLDO SURFHVVHV DQG
WHUURULVP¶12 Unfortunately, the negative connotation applied to the term has taken root, at least in 
VRPHFLUFOHV$UJXDEO\ LQ LWVFRQWHPSRUDU\XVH ODZIDUHµLVXVHGPRVWFRPPRQO\DVDODEHO WR
criticize those who use international law and legal proceedings to make claims against the state, 
especially in areas related to national sHFXULW\¶13 8VHGLQWKLVZD\µWKHWHUPµODZIDUH¶>LVPHDQW@
WRGLVFUHGLWDQRSSRQHQW¶VUHOLDQFHRQODZDQGOHJDOSURFHGXUH¶14 Jon Keller suggests that use of 
WKHWHUPODZIDUHLVµMXVWDVKRUWKDQGIRU³,GLVDJUHHZLWK;¶VOHJDODFWLRQV´¶15 Some experts claim 
that the definition of lawfare can only encompass the misuse or manipulation of law to achieve an 
operational objective,16 E\ OLPLWLQJ WKH FRQFHSW WR µDQ H[SORLWDWLRQ RI WKH ODZ¶ RU µZURQJIXO
manipulation of the law and legal system to achieve strategic mLOLWDU\RUSROLWLFDOHQGV¶17 We find 
                                                          
9
 5LFKDUG )DON µ3RVLWLYH DQG 1HJDWLYH )RUPV RI ´/DZIDUH´
 Foreign Policy Journal, 
<http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/02/24/positive-and-negative-forms-of-lawfare/> 15 May 2015.  
10 Dunlap, supra note 7, p. 146. 
11
 Ibid. . 146-154. 
12
 Werner, supra note 3, p. 64. 
13
 0LFKDHO6FKDUIDQG(OL]DEHWK$QGHUVHQµ,V/DZIDUH:RUWK'HILQLQJ"5HSRUWRIWKH&OHYHODQG([SHUWV0HHWLQJ
6HSWHPEHU¶Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law  (2011), 11-28, p. 12. 
14
 Werner, supra note 3, page 69.  
15
 Kevin J. Keller, 1R*RLQJWRWKH,&&,V1RWµ/DZIDUH¶E\3DOHVWLQH, 22 January 2015, 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2015/01/22/no-going-icc-not-palestinian-lawfare/>, 28 September 2015. 
16 The Lawfare Project. Lawfare: The Use of the Law as a Weapon of War, 
<http://www.thelawfareproject.org/what-is-lawfare.html>, 5 December 2015. 
17
 See definitions similar to those provided by The Lawfare Project, discussed in the Report of the Cleveland Expert 
Meeting, 11 September 2010, supra note 13, p. 18. 
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this unhelpful and missing the spirit in which the term was originally introduced, and also as being 
a misrepresentation of what law actually is. A retributive legal system is adversarial; it is a tool 
used by parties in conflict (not necessarily armed conflict) to resolve that conflict to their 
(presumed) benefit. To suggest that appeal to law by interested parties for self-interested 
motivations is immoral, that it is somehow separate from the general use of law, is to attach to law 
some lofty moral, unreasonable rigor.   
 The other side of the coin questions not whether lawfare is neutral or a morally problematic 
strategy, but how broadly the term should be used, and what types of actions it should cover. The 
term has EHHQXVHGYHU\EURDGO\ WRGHVFULEH DJHQGDV WRXVH µLQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ IRUSURSDJDQGD
SXUSRVHV IRU H[DPSOH E\ RUFKHVWUDWLQJ FLYLOLDQ GHDWKV¶18or the use of international law for 
strategic and military advantage, such as Dunlap's example of an instance when the US military 
bought up the exclusive rights to all satellite images of Afghanistan in 2001 so that its opponents 
could not do so.19  John Yoo, one of the best-known US government lawyers who wrote the so-
FDOOHG³WRUWXUHPHPRV´ µLQGLUHFWO\ERDVWHGDERXW lawfare by titling his memoir War By Other 
Means¶20  Others include in their understanding of lawfare engaging in debates about legal 
interpretations, hiding among civilians in a conflict (arguably itself a war crime),21 or even rulings 
made by the International Court of Justice.22 Private lawsuits against terrorist groups and states 
                                                          
18
 Scharf and Andersen, supra note 13.  
19
 Dunlap, supra note 7, p. 147. 
20 'DYLG/XEDQµ&DUO6FKPLWWDQGWKH &ULWLTXHRI/DZIDUH¶Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
Paper No. 11-33 (2010) 1-13, p. 1.  
21
 -DPLH$:LOOLDPVRQµ7KH.QLJKW
V&RGH1RWKLV/DQFH¶Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
(2010), 447-455, p. 448. 
22 See e.g., The Lawfare Project, <http://www.thelawfareproject.org/what-is-lawfare.html>, 5 December 2015. 
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supporting terrorism as well as economic sanctions have also been characterised as examples of 
lawfare.23 In the most recent article on the topic, Alana Tiemessen narrows the defLQLWLRQWRµWKH
FRHUFLYH DQG VWUDWHJLF HOHPHQW RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO FULPLQDO MXVWLFH LQ ZKLFK WKH ,&&¶V MXGLFLDO
interventions are used as a tool of lawfare for States Parties and the UNSC to pursue political 
HQGV¶24which comes closest to our own definition of international criminal lawfare in this paper. 
6KRXOGDOORIWKHVHH[DPSOHVEHULJKWO\LQFOXGHGXQGHUWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³ODZIDUH´"$UJXDEO\QR
Too broad a definition risks rendering the term relatively meaningless. 
It becomes evident that lawfare exists at the intersection of law and war but lacks the 
precisely articulated, and consistently used, definition necessary for a discussion of the ethical 
implications of its use. In fact, in 2010 a group of legal scholars convened to question precisely 
what lawfare really is.25 While some legal experts argued the term could be useful if more narrowly 
GHILQHGWKHUHZDVOLWWOHFRQVHQVXVDVWRKRZEHVWWRGHILQHLWGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWPRVWµSDUWLFLSDQWV
DJUHHGWKDWWKHUHDFWLYH³ULJKW-ZLQJ´FRQFHSWRI³ODZIDUH´FRQVWLWXWHGD³KLMDFNLQJ´RIWKHWHUP
DQGVKRXOGEHUHMHFWHG¶26 We suggest that a narrower definition is in fact needed to clarify what 
ODZIDUHHQFRPSDVVHVDQGWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKLWFDQDQGVKRXOGEHXVHG7KHWHUP³ODZIDUH´
should be limited to the use of judicial interventions as a tool for states, parties to conflict, and 
other interested actors to pursue political ends.27 This definition makes three important points about 
                                                          
23
 Scharf and Andersen, supra note 13, p. 17. 
24
 $ODQD7LHPHVVHQµ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUWDQGWKHODZIDUHRIMXGLFLDOLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶International 
Relations (2015) 1-23, p. 6. 
25
 Scharf and  Andersen, supra note 13. 
26
 Ibid., p. 13. 
27
 This definition is a variation of Tiemessen's definition, supra note 24, p. 2. 
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the concept of lawfare: first, the scope of the definition is such that acts can be evaluated against 
the definition for fit, thereby eliminating a broad and meaningless use of the term; second, it cannot 
be employed simply as shorthand for criticism, since it refers to characterisable acts; and, third, 
under this definition, lawfare can include uses of law and legal processes that complement as well 
as substitute for traditional military means, and include both positive and negative motivations for 
appealing to law. 
 If lawfare is defined as the above-mentioned tool of using judicial interventions, then 
international criminal lawfare is the use of international criminal judicial interventions as a tool 
for states, parties to conflict, and other interested actors, including  the UNSC, to pursue political 
ends. We regard the characterisation currently assigned to lawfare in popular discourse as both too 
broad and too limiting, in that it depicts lawfare as encompassing a variety of disparate acts and 
also as largely the manipulation or misuse of law to achieve operational objectives.28 The positive 
implications to a more precise definition include, first, the hope that it would in fact encourage 
relevant parties to a conflict to pursue their conflict in a judicial theatre as opposed to a theatre of 
DUPHGFRQIOLFW$GHILQLWLRQWKDWµincludes the proper use of law as a substitute for military means 
HQFRXUDJHVXVLQJODZLQVWHDGRIPLOLWDU\IRUFH¶29 DQGVXSSRUWVµDUDFHWRWKHFRXUWURRPLQVWHDGRI
WRWKHEDWWOHILHOG¶30 As Dunlap notes, recourse to the courts is a facet of lawfare to be encouraged.31 
Second, a more precise definition, coupled with a more consistent use of the concept would focus 
                                                          
28
 See The Lawfare Project, <http://www.thelawfareproject.org/what-is-lawfare.html>, 11 November 2015. 
29
 Scharf and Andersen, supra note 13, p. 17. 
30
 Ibid.  
31
 Dunlap, supra note 7, p. 149. 
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the debate on the plausible proper nature of lawfare while simultaneously narrowing the conceptual 
lens on what is considered legitimate resorts to the rule of law.  
 Interpretations of lawfare as recourses to law, absent any moral judgement based simply 
on the appeal to law, are most appropriate.  /RXLVH$UERXU¶VZRUGVDFNQRZOHGJLQJWKHFRPSOH[
range of manifestations of lawfare best reflect our own conviction triggering the ethical defence 
of international criminal lawfare: 
/DZIDUH LV LQ DQG RI LWVHOI QHLWKHU JRRG QRU EDG«6SXULRXV RU RXWULJKW IDOVH
claims threaten to bring the entire concept of humanitarian law into disrepute, and 
can create the erroneous perception that it is the law itself ± and not its deliberate 
misapplication ± ZKLFK LV DW IDXOW %XW FU\LQJ ³ODZIDUH´ « FUHDWHV WKH
appearance that the accused cannot MXVWLI\WKHLUDFWLRQV«32 
 
While misuses and manipulations of ICL exist and there is need for systemic changes for 
ICL to be more resistant to these, we should not disregard the potential of ICL to create positive 
outcomes. In the next section, we look at some recent accusations of lawfare, which affect the ICC 
in its unique position as an international criminal court that can investigate and adjudicate cases 
from ongoing conflict. And while these lawfare cases have had negative effects on the Court's 
legitimacy, we show that it is not true that lawfare itself is to blame. We explore the conditions 
that lead to faults in how lawfare has been perceived recently and pinpoint ethical considerations 
which could salvage the concept from an exclusive focus on unjust manipulation. These conditions 
DUHWKHQLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶VPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\WR
support just reforms of the system. 
                                                          
32
 /RXLVH$UERXUµ7KH/DZVRI:DU8QGHU6LHJHRU*DLQLQJ*URXQG"¶6SHHFK-XQH$XVWUDOLDQ1DWLRQDO
University, Canberra, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2011/the-laws-of-war-under-
siege-or-gaining-ground.aspx>, 12 November  2015. 
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3. International  Criminal Lawfare and the Conditions that Lead to Perception Faults  
 
Since its entry into force in 2002, the ICC has made strides in its pursuit for accountability for 
international crimes. In its formative years, a few remarkable and unpredicted characteristics 
HPHUJHG WKHVH KDYH ERWK VWUHQJWKHQHG DQG GHFUHDVHG WKH &RXUW¶V FODLPV WR OHJLWLPDF\ $
significant one is a proclivity for states to refer situations occurring within their own borders. It 
was not envisioned that any state would self-refer, and yet the first three situations before the Court 
- Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Central African Republic (CAR) - 
were each referred by the states themselves. 
In theory, self-referrals can do much to bolster the legitimacy of the Court. The ICC obtains 
further legitimacy when member-states invite the Court in to investigate and judge a particular 
situation. This is one of three ways in which the ICC can establish jurisdiction, which include: a 
member-state referral of a situation, a referral by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, or an investigation initiated by the ICC Prosecutor in accordance 
with Article 15 of the Rome Statute. With all three options, there is potential for attempts by 
interested parties to use the Court to influence an ongoing conflict. Each of the examples discussed 
in this section represents an instance of lawfare that has negatively affected the legitimacy of ICL. 
We contend with the idea that the fault lies with lawfare per se. Rather, the use of lawfare makes 
problems of the system or court transparent. Highlighted by tricky cases of lawfare, it might seem 
that these problems either originate with the pursuit of lawfare or they can be eliminated if lawfare 
12 
 
is deemed immoral and prevented. Misunderstanding the connection between the use of lawfare 
and problems with the system as cause-and-effect, however, can invite some unwelcome results, 
including the dissuasion of parties to conflict from appealing to ICL when appropriate out of fear 
of being negatively perceived for doing so.  
  It is true that the bias and selectivity reflected in the operations of the ICC affect both the 
real and perceived legitimacy of ICL.33 However, what is not evident is that it is the use of 
international criminal lawfare that has created this bias and selectivity. Examples of 
contemporaneous situations before the Court, such as Uganda, Darfur, Libya, and Palestine, 
demonstrate different aspects of the combination of lawfare and abuse of law that cannot and 
should not be conflated with lawfare itself. It is this combination, we argue, that gives international 
criminal lawfare its negative connotation and distasteful characterisation. There is a difference 
between appealing to law with self-interested motivations and intentionally perverting, hindering, 
or obstructing law. 
 
 
3.1 Lawfare by  State Referrals 
 
Despite a number of states having self-referred situations to date, not one has helped with 
legitimising the ICC, and in fact each has in some manner negatively impacted the legitimacy of 
the ICC. The biggest problem is that the ICC depends on the self-referring governments for 
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 Kirsten J Fisher, Moral Accountability and International Criminal Law (New York: Routledge, 2012).  
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cooperation to gain access to witnesses and evidence and to assist with investigations and 
SURVHFXWLRQV7KLVFRQWULEXWHVWRWKH,&&¶VOHJLWLPDF\GHILFLWZKLFKLVHQKDQFHGE\VWDWHV¶ODFNRI
compliance with the CoXUW¶VUHTXHVWVIRUHYLGHQFHDQGFRRSHUDWLRQ 
 The Ugandan example demonstrates how a referring party both invited the ICC to 
investigate alleged crimes committed in an ongoing conflict, therefore employing lawfare, and 
expected and received preferential treatment and a one-sided investigation of abuses committed. 
8JDQGD¶V3UHVLGHQW<RZHUL0XVHYHQLUHIHUUHGWKHVLWXDWLRQWRWKH,&&LQ'HFHPEHU,WZDV
the first situation (and first cases) before the Court, with arrest warrants issued in 2005. Museveni 
LQYLWHGWKH&RXUWWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHFRPPLVVLRQRIFULPHVE\WKHUHEHOJURXSWKH/RUG¶V5HVLVWDQFH
Army (LRA)34 and the investigation initially yielded five indictments of the then-top leadership of 
the LRA. Despite his insistence that the Court investigates all sides equally, Chief Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo's decision was that no crimes committed by the Ugandan army warranted ICC 
indictments.35 His determination to charge only LRA leaders and not members of the Ugandan 
DUP\WKH8JDQGD3HRSOH¶V'HIHQFH)orce (UPDF), which had reportedly committed its own share 
of atrocities, for brutalities committed in Uganda lead to criticism both in Uganda and 
internationally.36 6RPH FULWLFV SRLQW WR 2FDPSR¶V MRLQW SUHVV FRQIHUHQFH ZLWK 0XVHYHQL WKH
                                                          
34 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUWµPresident of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 
WRWKH,&&¶Press Release ICC-20040129-44 (2004) <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/president%20of%20uganda%20refers%
20situation%20concerning%20the%20lord_s%20resistance%20army%20_lra_%20to%20the%20icc.aspx>, 20 May 
2015. 
35
 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda Arrest Warrants (14 October 2005) 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3255817D-FD00-4072-9F58-
FDB869F9B7CF/143834/LMO_20051014_English1.pdf>, 15 May 2015. 
36
 $GDP%UDQFKµ8JDQGD¶V&LYLO:DUDQGWKH3ROLWLFVRI,&&,QWHUYHQWLRQ¶Ethics and International Affairs 
(2007) 179-198. 
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mention of (only) the LRA in the initial press releases, and indictments of only LRA members for 
atrocities committed in northern Uganda as evidence of lack of objectivity in the Court's response, 
perhaps for prudential reasons.37   
 The motivations of the Ugandan government are clear: the self-referral was aimed at 
GLVFUHGLWLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW
VRSSRQHQWLQWKHFRQIOLFWµWRGHOHJLWLPL]HDQGUHPRYH«WURXEOHVRPH
LQVXUJHQWVWKDWFRXOGQRWEHGHIHDWHGPLOLWDULO\¶38 Separate from the government's motivation in 
referring the situation to the ICC, however, is the Court's response to the referral. When the ICC 
must, or feels that it must, rely on the goodwill of the government of the territory, it will be 
constrained by politics as much as law, and is hampered in its performing its duties. When the 
referring party is both a party to the conflict and the sovereign over the territory, there is fertile 
ground for real and perceived inappropriate interference. Here, then, we have the potential for a 
dangerous combination of use of lawfare (neutral) and interference (morally wrong).  
 Palestine provides a more recent example of self-referral, which despite being unique, also 
highlights the limitations of the current system for objectively adjudicating crimes committed in 
ZDU3DOHVWLQH¶VVHOf-referral is perhaps a good example of the use of lawfare to invite a supposedly 
just and objective arbiter to weigh in on a conflict and tactics taken in war. And although the 
referral invites (at least in theory) investigation into the actions of both sides to the conflict, it was 
met by political obstacles that hindered the Court operating as it might. Arguably, the attempts 
                                                          
37
 0LFKDHO2WLPDQG0DULHNH:LHUGDµ-XVWLFHDW-XED,QWHUQDWLRQDO2EOLJDWLRQVDQG/RFDO'HPDQGVLQ1RUWKHUQ
8JDQGD¶LQ1:DGGHOODQG3&ODUNHGVCourting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa (Royal African 
Society, London, 2008) 21-28,  p 22.  
38
 Alana Tiemessen, The Paradox of Lawfare, 10 May 2012, OpenCanada.org, 
<https://www.opencanada.org/features/the-paradox-of-lawfare/>, 12 May 2015. 
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PDGHE\SRZHUIXOVWDWHVWRIUXVWUDWH3DOHVWLQH¶VJHWWLQJLWVVLWXDWLRQEHIRUHWKH&RXUWDVZHOODV
the characterization of the referral as a negative instance of lawfare, could be seen as obstructive 
political maneuvering.  
       It took significant political effort for Palestine to be able to invite an investigation into 
potential crimes committed within its territory. On 22 January 2009, the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) lodged a declaration with the Registrar of the ICC pursuant to article 12(3) of the 
5RPH6WDWXWHWRLQYHVWLJDWHµDFWVFRPPLWWHGRQWKHWHUULWRU\RI3DOHVWLQHVLQFH-XO\¶2Q
April 2012, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC issued a decision stating that the OTP 
lacked jurisdiction to investigate alleged international crimes committed within the Palestinian 
territories because it could not make the legal determination whether Palestine qualifies as a State 
for the purpose of acceding to the Rome Statute. In its decision, it claimed that the issue sat with 
µFRPSHWHQWRUJDQVRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVRUHYHQWXDOO\WKH$VVHPEO\RI6WDWHV3DUWLHV>WR@UHVROYH
the legal issue relevant to an assessment RIDUWLFOH¶39 On 29 November 2012, the United Nations 
General Assembly voted, by overwhelming majority,40 to promote Palestine to non-Member 
Observer State status in the United Nations, against the adamant opposition of some states, 
including Israel, the United States, and Canada.41 The result was that the UN General Assembly 
had now formally recognized Palestine as a state and it could again invite the jurisdiction of the 
                                                          
39 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Palestine, 3 April 2012, <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf>,  
23 July 2015. 
40 UN General Assembly draft resolution A/67/L.28, conferring Palestine non-member observer state status in the 
UN, passed by a vote of 138 to 9.  
41 Kevin J. HelOHUµ%ULWDLQWR6XSSRUW3DOHVWLQH¶V81*$5HVROXWLRQ"¶Opinio Juris, 27 November 2012, 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2012/11/26/britain-to-support-palestines-unga-resolution/>, 20 September 2015. 
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ICC. It can invite investigation and other states can also now file war crimes complaints against 
Fatah and Hamas regarding actions against Israel or other states. 
 On 31 December 2014, Palestine granted the ICC jurisdiction to investigate crimes 
FRPPLWWHGµLQWKHRFFXSLHG3DOHVWLQLDQWHUULWRU\LQFOXGLQJ(DVW-HUXVDOHPVLQFH-XQH¶
a date which corresponds roughly with the beginning of the 2014 Gaza war.42 Palestine acceded 
to the Rome Statute on 1 April 2015 and the PNA handed over its first submission of evidence of 
supposed Israeli war crimes to the Court in June with the aim of speeding up an ICC inquiry into 
abuses committed during the 2014 Gaza conflict. The Prosecutor, not the Palestinian Authority, 
will ultimately decide whether to open a full criminal investigation. Complicating matters is 
,VUDHO¶VVHHPLQJUHIXVDOWRFRRSHUDWHZLWKDQ\LQYHVWLJDWLRQ43 The ICC Prosecutor has declared 
that she will investigate the existence of crimes even-handedly, considering whether there were 
(sufficiently grave) crimes committed by Israel in Gaza and by Hamas and Palestinian Groups by 
firing rockets into Israel.44 Powerful states that opposed the referral still oppose the possibility of 
the Court opening a formal investigation, including the US and Israel. Erecting obstacles to the 
Court's ability to function effectively can be considered unwarranted and inappropriate 
interference, if it can be assumed that the Court would legitimately pursue an objective 
                                                          
42 ICC, Palestine, <www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/p
e-ongoing/palestine/Pages/palestine.aspx>, 30 October 2015. 
43  ‘,&&XUJHV,VUDHOWRFRRSHUDWHZLWKSUHOLPLQDU\*D]DSUREH¶The Times of Israel, 13 May 2015, 
<www.timesofisrael.com/icc-urges-israel-to-cooperate-with-preliminary-gaza-probe/>, 11 November 2015. 
44 Aeyal Grossµ,&&3URVHFXWRU/RZ-ranking Israeli Soldiers, as Well as Palestinians, Could Be Prosecuted for 
:DU&ULPHV¶Haaretz, 1 May 2015, <www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.654516>, 15 November 2015.  
µ,&&SURVHFXWRUUHMHFWV,VUDHO¶VIHDUVRIELDVLQZDUFULPHVLQYHVWLJDWLRQ¶RT, 2 May 2015, 
<www.rt.com/news/255037-icc-israel-palestine-unbiased-investigation/>, 15 November 2015.  
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investigation of potential war crimes committed by either side. Legitimate investigation might 
have real positive outcomes for civilians living in the area, as can be the case as both sides try to 
win a public relations victory of their own.45 
Uganda and Palestine provide just two examples of self-referrals which proved to be 
problematic, negatively affecting the legitimacy of the ICC and the enterprise of ICL itself. What 
these cases show is the vulnerability of the ICC to politics and power. WhLOH3DOHVWLQH¶VFRQWH[WLV
XQLTXHLQWKDW LW LVXQOLNHO\WKH ,&&ZLOODJDLQFRQWHQGZLWKWKHTXHVWLRQRIDUHIHUULQJSDUW\¶V
eligibility for statehood, it, like the Ugandan situation, shows the reliance of the ICC on the de 
facto sovereign of the territory to be able to effectively pursue its work. Under conditions in which 
the Court would not need to rely on the goodwill of parties to the conflict to pursue its 
investigations, international criminal  lawfare could be an effective means of restraining violations 
of international humanitarian law (IHL).   
 
3.2  /DZIDUHWKURXJKWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶V-XGLFLDO,QWHUYHQWLRQV 
 
The Libyan example demonstrates how the UNSC, as representative of the international 
community, can engage in lawfare by referring a situation to the Court, and at the same time both 
avoid referring another like situation because of the self-interest of members of the UNSC, and 
also shielding particular actors from investigation. UNSC resolution 1970, which was adopted 
                                                          
45 +\HUDQ-RDQG%HWK$6LPPRQVµ&DQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW'HWHU$WURFLW\"¶Social Science 
Research Network, 18 December 2014, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2552820>, 12 January 2015. 
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unanimously on 26 February 2011, referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, and condemned the 
*DGGDILJRYHUQPHQW¶VXVHRIOHWKDOIRUFHDJDLQVWSURWHVWHUV46 It passed in the midst of an ongoing 
conflict. The ICC investigation began on 3 March 2011, and the Court issued an arrest warrant for 
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, among others, on 27 June 2011.47 Arguably, the UNSC itself engaged 
in lawfare in order to alter the trajectory of the conflict in Libya, at the same time as it worked to 
bring individuals to justice.  
 What was particularly problematic in SC Resolution 1970 referring the Libyan situation to 
WKH,&&ZDVWKHVSHFLILFH[FOXVLRQIURPWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQRIQDWLRQDOVRIDQ\VWDWHRWKHUWKDQ
Libya that is not party to the Rome Statute.48 The treatment of non-Libyan actors in this situation 
is reflective of the influence of the UNSC and other powerful global actors. Excluding citizens of 
non-state parties (other than Libya) hinders the ability of the Court to investigate and prosecute 
any crimes committed within its jurisdiction in the geographical and temporal  situation referred, 
and also acts to shield UNSC interests. The International Commission of Inquiry on Libya 
investigated allegations of the commission of international crimes in Libya, including investigating 
allegations that NATO was responsible for violations of IHL.49 However, any crimes judged to 
                                                          
46
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, S/RES/1970 (2011).  
47
  ICC, Libya, ICC-01/11, <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0111/Pages/situation%20index.aspx>, 6 July 2015.   
48
 $FFRUGLQJWR2SHUDWLYHSDUDJUDSKRI65(6WKH816&µ'HFLGHVWKDWQDWLRQDOVFXUUHQWRU
former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged 
acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by 
WKH&RXQFLOXQOHVVVXFKH[FOXVLYHMXULVGLFWLRQKDVEHHQH[SUHVVO\ZDLYHGE\WKH6WDWH¶ 
49 .HYLQ-+HOOHUµ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPLVVLRQRI,QTXLU\RQ/LE\D$&ULWLFDO$QDO\VLV¶LQ-HQV0HLHUKHQULFK
(ed.), International Commissions: The Role of Commissions of Inquiry in the Investigation of International Crimes, 
(2013), p. 4. 
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have been committed by NATO personnel would almost certainly not be addressed by the ICC 
due to the restricted resolution. Such VHOHFWLYLW\GLPLQLVKHVWKH,&&¶VSHUFHLYHGLPSDUWLDOLW\DQG
legitimacy, and portrays it as a political tool of the UNSC.50 
  Similar problems related to particular interests of the powerful UNSC member states, who 
want to shield the nationals of specific states from potential indictments, were seen in the first 
UNSC referral to the ICC, UNSC Resolution 1593, adopted on 31 March 2005, referring the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC. Just like SC Resolution 1970, this resolution also includes 
an Operative paragraph 6, which excludes investigations of non-state parties, with the exception 
of Sudan.51 7KLVKDVEHHQGXEEHGµWKHPRVWFRQWURYHUVLDODVSHFWRIWKHUHIHUUDO¶52, and troubling, 
VLQFHµWKHH[FOXVLRQRIVRPHVWDWHV¶QDWLRQDOVDQGPDNHVLWGLIILFXOt to reconcile the resolution 
ZLWKWKHSULQFLSOHRIHTXDOLW\EHIRUHWKHODZ6RPHVWDWHV¶QDWLRQDOVDUHPRUHHTXDOWKDQRWKHUV¶53 
Both these referrals to the ICC to date include elements that are deeply problematic and which 
impact negatively on the perception of international criminal intervention in ongoing conflict. In 
both referrals, Operative paragraph 6 illustrates the intentional  obstructions of the pursuit of ICL.  
 Given that the ICC does not have unfettered global reach, UNSC referrals are the only 
RSWLRQWKDWOHDYHVWKHVWDWH¶VPHPEHUVKLSWRWKH5RPH6WDWXWHH[WUDQHRXVDQGWKHUHIRUHH[SDQG
                                                          
50
 See e.g. $QGUHD%LUGVDOOµ7KH5HVSRQVLELOLW\WR3URVHFXWHDQGWKH,&&$3UREOHPDWLF5HODWLRQVKLS¶Criminal 
Law Forum (2015) 51-72, p. 67. 
51 2SHUDWLYHSDUDJUDSKRI6&5HVROXWLRQ6&5HVVWDWHVWKDWµ...nationals, current or former officials or 
personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or 
RPLVVLRQVDULVLQJRXWRIRUUHODWHGWRRSHUDWLRQVLQ6XGDQ«¶<www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm>, 12 
October 2015. 
52 5REHUW&U\HUµ6XGDQ5HVROXWLRQDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH¶Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2006) 195-222, p. 208. 
53 Ibid., p. 217. 
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the reach of international criminal justice. The referrals of the Darfur and Libya situations reflect 
the UNSC engaging in lawfare, which only became problematic, however, when intentional 
manifestations to obstruct the pursuit of impartial justice were evident within Operative paragraphs 
6, posing clear challenges for the international community to support equitable treatment globally.  
 Unsurprisingly, there were expectations that the referral of Libya to the ICC ought to be 
followed by other like situations, including Syria.54 A number of parallels between these two 
situations include the brutality by which the regime attempted ± or still attempts ± to suppress the 
will of the populace, the widespread violence and destruction civilians experienced, and the 
fragmentation of the opposition which creates a situation where a unified government ± and, with 
it, domestic judicial systems able to dispense objective modes of justice ± is difficult to establish. 
Syria, like Libya, is not a member state of the ICC and therefore, UNSC referral is the only way 
to bring the situation before the Court.  Of course, there is reason to question the benefit of such a 
referral, aVWKHUHIHUUDORI/LE\DDUJXDEO\µGLGQRWKHOSUHVROYHWKHFULVLVEXWLQVWHDGDGGHGIXHOWR
WKHIODPHVRIFRQIOLFW¶55  
Nevertheless, this situation highlights the problem of the current make-up of UNSC power, 
especially the special veto power held by the permanent five (P5) members. The lack of UNSC 
attention to Syria is arguably not reflective of a lack of international will but rather the power of 
individual P5 members that possess veto power and can protect their allies from investigation by 
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 E.g., Birdsall, supra note 50. 
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 /HLOD6DGDWµ*HQRFLGHLQ6\ULD,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO2SWLRQV,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO/LPLWVDQGWKH6HULRXV3UREOHP
RI3ROLWLFDO:LOO¶Impunity Watch Law Journal 1 (2015), Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies 
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blocking any attempts to refer a case to the ICC. Arguably, ties between Syria and permanent 
members of the UNSC, namely Russia and China, shield it from referral.56 To some, this state of 
affairs is an example of politics in the absence of objective justice, where legal principles become 
µVXEVHUYLHQWWRSROLWLFDODJHQGDV¶57 
 Each of the four examples mentioned above demonstrates ways in which referrals to the 
ICC resulted in conditions that negatively affected the real or perceived legitimacy of the Court. 
Each example also demonstrates a way in which an appeal to criminal law as a just arbiter of 
behaviour in conflict was accompanied by intentional perverting, hindering, or obstructing of the 
pursuit of objective criminal law. The mere fact that international legal instruments exist and offer 
the veil of credibility, and the appearance of appealing to reason and the moral high ground, creates 
conditions for ICL to be regarded as potential - and potent - tools in the proverbial 'arsenal' when 
confronted with a conflict. The availability of these legal instruments provides agents with a 
choice: to use them or not, hoping for advantage for one position or side of the conflict. What 
should not be part of the calculation is the belief or knowledge that conditions exist for easy 
manipulation of the system.   
 
4. The International Responsibility to Contribute to Structural Justice 
                                                          
56 On 23 May, 2014, Russia and China vetoed a draft French resolution (co-sponsored by more than 60 states) to 
refer the situation in Syria to the ICC for possible prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
during the Syrian civil war. This was the fourth, and last draft resolution so far, double-vetoed by Russia and China, 
with all other members of the SC voting in favour. 
57 /RXLVH$UERXUµ7KH5HODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH,&&DQGWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶Global Governance (2014) 
195-201, p. 199.   
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The pursuit of lawfare per seLQWKHIRUPRIYDULRXVDJHQWV¶DSSHDOVWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOODZ
as opposed to recourse to force, must not necessarily affect the legitimacy of the ICC or other 
FRXUWVQHJDWLYHO\$V5LFKDUG)DONDUJXHVZHVKRXOGQRWµGHQLJUDWHUHOLDQFHRQWKHSURFHGXUHV
and norms of international law in seeking to pursue rights or hold individuals accountable for 
violations of inteUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOODZ¶58 There is potential for good in the adjudication of ICL in 
the midst of ongoing conflict, restricted to a disinterested judge in the form of an international 
institution. This, however, puts significant stress on the international institution to exude fairness 
and the perception of fairness. Bias and selectivity reflected in the operations of the ICC affect 
both the real and perceived legitimacy of ICL.  
Situations in which parties to a conflict attempt to garner advantage over their opponents 
through a referral to the ICC or other international judicial body, irrespective of self-serving and 
unjust motivations and expectations of the referring parties, is a condition to which international 
law and politics should aspire: lawfare over warfare. When used in this way, ICL can add an 
additional, non-lethal dimension to a conflict, and also shift the discussion and debate to a third 
party, and away from the belligerents. This aspiration for ICL, however, puts significant moral 
responsibility on the international community, both to support the objective application of 
international criminal law in all situations investigated by the Court and also to ensure that referrals 
by the international community's representative (the UNSC) is just and even-handed.  
                                                          
58
 5LFKDUG)DONµ3RVLWLYHDQG1HJDWLYH)RUPVRI³/DZIDUH´¶Foreign Policy Journal (Winter 2008) 146-154. 
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One of the justifications for ICL is that international applications of law can be more 
objective in situations where it would be difficult for local administers of law to be.59 As such, 
objectivity and the perception of objectivity should be a high priority for the ICC. The use of 
international criminal lawfare can be a practical and effective means of lessening the negative 
effects of conflict on civilians, with indictments and arrests removing criminal actors from the 
stage of war and therefore altering the trajectory of the war and influencing the actions of 
belligerents, as was the case in the DRC,60 and the threat of referrals to the ICC influencing the 
behaviour of warring parties. It can also encourage the pursuit of justice domestically, when 
DSSURSULDWH WKURXJK DQ HPSKDVLV RQ SRVLWLYH FRPSOHPHQWDULW\ 7KH ,&&¶V ZRUN LQ &RORPELD
through incentives and threats, including pressuring the Colombian government to reform its 
domestic legal system, had positive results in terms of enhancing the capacity of Colombian justice 
mechanisms to prosecute crimes under the Rome Statute. 61 
Most scholars, however, point to the weak potential deterrent effect of the Court.62  Despite 
more evidence to the contrary, expectations of deterrence are still high. For instance, at the time 
of the UNSC Resolution 1970, several members of the UNSC expressed their hopes to see the 
                                                          
59 .HQQHWK5RWKµ7U\6DGGDPLQDQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUW¶Human Rights Watch, 14 December 2003;  ; Jonathan 
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62 See e.g.&KULVWRSKHU:0XOOLQVDQG'DZQ/5RWKHµ7KH$ELOLW\RIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUWWR'HWHU
9LRODWLRQVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO/DZ$7KHRUHWLFDO$VVHVVPHQW¶International Criminal Law Review (2010) 
771-786; Tiemessen, supra note 24. 
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referral - which was intended as a means to end the fighting in Libya - trigger a deterrent effect.63 
As we know, however, events unpacked very differently from such expectations. Nevertheless, 
although very limited, there is anecdotal evidence pointing to de-escalation of violence as a result 
of threats of potential ICC referrals. Some commentators refer to the relatively peaceful March 
2013 presidential elections in Kenya as illustrative of the deterrent effect of the existing charges 
against individuals allegedly responsible for the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007 and 
2008.64 2WKHUV SRLQW WR D SDUWLFXODU HSLVRGH LQ &RWH G¶,YRLUH LQ 1ovember 2004, when Juan 
Méndez, then UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide warned the Ivorian authorities 
that they could be held criminally responsible for the consequences of engaging in xenophobic 
hate speech which triggered violence, and as such, of the risks of an ICC referral if they do not end 
impunity and curb public expressions of racial or religious hatred.65 The offensive messages soon 
ceased, and violence subsided.66  
While there are different ways in which law can be used in the context of conflict, 
positively or negatively, appeals to international legal institutions seem to have promise. 
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 Two sWDWHPHQWVIURP816&PHPEHUVDWWKHWLPHDUHLOOXVWUDWLYHLQWKLVVHQVH,QGLDIRULQVWDQFHVWDWHGWKDWµWKH
UHIHUUDOWRWKH&RXUWZRXOGKDYHWKHHIIHFWRIDQLPPHGLDWHFHVVDWLRQRIYLROHQFH¶ZKLOH)UDQFHDUJXHGWKLVZDVDQ
LQVWDQFHZKHQWKH,&&µILQGVMXVWLILFDWLRQIRULWVH[LVWHQFH¶ Security Council, S/PV.649, 26 February 2011, New 
<RUNSIRU,QGLD¶VVWDWHPHQWDQGSIRU)UDQFH¶V
<http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/15043/S_PV.6491-EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>, 12 
November 2015. 
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 7KRPDV5DPRORXORVµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQGWKH$SSOLFDWLRQRIWKH7KLUG3LOODU$SSURDFK¶LQ'DQLHO)LRWWDQG
Joachim Koops (eds.) The Responsibility to Protect and the Third Pillar: Legitimacy and Operationalization 
(Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2014). 
65 See UN News Centre, Juan Mendez, Special UN adviser on genocide warns of ethnic hate messages in Côte 
d'Ivoire, 15 November 2004, <www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12527&Cr=ivoire&Cr1>, 12 October 
2015.  
66 Report of the UN Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, A/63/677, 12 January 2009, 
para. 55. 
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International institutions can help to avoid critical problems such as those introduced by the 
vagueness of law, the natural inclination toward vengeance, and seeing only one's own motivations 
or complaints as just.67 The objectivity provided by an international institution should also be able 
to tame the self-aggrandizing nature of appeals to law which posit one's own side as morally 
superior. In this way, institutionalizing retributive justice in an international institution like the 
ICC is possibly the best chance of averting abuse of power cloaked in the vocabulary of law. 
Furthermore, these international institutions introduce a third party to the conflict which 
shifts the focus ± even if ever so slightly ± from interactions between the opposing agents to a 
third, internationally recognised and legitimate entity with legal and political clout. In essence, the 
involvement of international institutions with objective legal and procedural elements may in fact 
shift the focus of the conflict which may provide a new legal and political space in which the 
participants can manoeuvre.  This sort of widening of the realm of the conflict may reveal a more 
nuanced prism through which the very conflict may be judged, or even decided. The problems 
appear when the use of lawfare is confused with intentional obfuscations of justice. The examples 
in this article demonstrate how the enterprise of ICL is hampered by the reality of current 
conditions that affect the ability of the Court to pursue justice unfettered, and be seen to do so. 
They also show the need for more support from the international community for the Court to pursue 
justice unfettered where the commission of atrocity crimes is suspected.68  
                                                          
67 The idea that legal institutions are necessary as a solution to these problems has a long, established history. See 
:ŽŚŶ>ŽĐŬĞ ?Ɛ^ĞĐŽŶĚdƌĞĂƚŝƐĞĨŽƌĂůŝďĞƌĂůĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐŝĚĞĂ. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, C.B. 
Macpherson (ed.) (Hackett, Cambridge, 1980).  
68  &ĂƚŽƵĞŶƐŽƵĚĂ ? ‘tŚŝƚŚĞƌ/-hE^ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞ ? ?ƐƚĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐĂŶĚKƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Criminal Justice Today, 10 December 2015, <www.international-criminal-justice-
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The use of lawfare makes problems of the system transparent. There is, thus, a moral 
responsibility to clarify that these problems per se need to be addressed, and that the solution is 
not to deem lawfare as always immoral. For example, the relationship between the ICC and the 
UNSC, as it stands, negatively affects the Court's work and reputation by generating a condition 
in which its caseload is shaped by the concerns and self-interests of permanent members of the 
UNSC. Since a referral by the UNSC is the method by which the 'international community' can 
initiate ICL proceedings, reforms to this body to ensure its objectivity are a moral concern to all 
members of the UN.69 All states, as actors who contribute to the structural injustice, have this 
responsibility to work towards change. 
7KH³UHVSRQVLELOLW\QRWWRYHWR´SURSRVDOLVSDUWLFXODUO\VDOLHQWVLQFHWKHUHDUHWKRVHZKR
already raised questions about the appropriateness of the UNSC as a referring body, when three of 
LWVSHUPDQHQWPHPEHUV86&KLQD5XVVLDDUHQRWVWDWHSDUWLHVDQGDVVXFKQRWXQGHUWKH,&&¶V
jurisdiction themselves.70 There is broad support for the two main veto restrain proposals - the 
French Proposal, and the Accountability, Coherence, TransparenF\ $&7 *URXS¶V ³&RGH RI
&RQGXFW´ - as seen in the most recent debates on the topic in the UN General Assembly, in 
                                                          
today.org/arguendo/article/whither-icc-unsc-relations-in-the-21st-century-challenges-and-opportunities/>, 10 
December 2015. 
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  France, for instance, took the initiative toward refraining the veto further, and held a conference on 21 January 
2015 with the aim to increase the political cost for P5 members that would block action that could relieve instances 
of mass atrocity7KH)UHQFKLQLWLDWLYHFDOOVIRUDµVWDWHPHQWRISULQFLSOHV¶WREHVLJQHGE\WKH3WKDWDIILUPVWKHLU
commitment to refrain from using the veto.   
70
 E.g. Birdsall, supra note 48, p. 68. 
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September 2015.71 The moral argument that mass atrocity crimes are so egregious that different 
rules should apply captures the essence of such ethical appeals.72 
To be morally sufficient, an institution or doctrine must, minimally, not interfere with the 
satisfaction of basic human rights. In the case of an enterprise that imposes international order, it 
must be shaped so that all persons subjected to it are, if not equally able to benefit from it, not 
harmed by its arrangement.73 When an institutional order that coercively limits actions alternative 
to its own and itself avoidably fails to protect human rights, the order and the participants of it are 
violating a duty of justice.74 Therefore, all member states of the ICC, but more broadly all states 
globally as participants in an international order that creates the rules of ICL, have the moral 
responsibility to ensure that the system in which they participate and which has so much power is 
a just one. In regards to international criminal lawfare, justice demands that parties to a conflict 
have equal access to an international institution (ICC) to make pronouncements about the legality 
of tactics taken and that parties to the conflict are treated equitably under the law. 
 
 
                                                          
71 See µ:K\)UDQFHZLVKHVWRUHJXODWHXVHRIWKHYHWRLQWKH811DWLRQV6HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶
<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/article/why-
france-wishes-to-regulate-use>, 12 October 2015; and Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group, 
µ([SODQDWRU\1RWH¶RQD&RGHRI&RQGXFWUHJDUGLQJ6HFXULW\&RXQFLODFWLRQDJDLQVWJHQRFLGHFULPHVDJDLQVW
humanity or war crimes, 1 September 2015, New York, 
<http://www.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/Final%202015-09-
01%20SC%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20Atrocity.pdf>, 25 October 2015. 
72 Ibid. 
73 I. Marion <RXQJµ5HVSRQVLELOLW\DQG*OREDO-XVWLFH$6RFLDO&RQQHFWLRQ0RGHO¶Social Philosophy and Policy 
Foundation (2006) 102-130. 
74 Thomas 3RJJHµ+XPDQ5LJKWVDQG+XPDQ5HVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶LQ$QGUHZ.XSHUHGGlobal Responsibilities 
(Routledge, New York, 2005), pp. 3-36. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The use of lawfare is inevitable, and not necessarily contemptible. While we do not want to praise 
every self-interested referral to the ICC or other appeal to ICL as the height of morality, there are 
real ways in which the use of lawfare can contribute to peacebuilding and the promotion of respect 
for law. As it stands, however, the term is now unwieldy, and the negative connotations can mask 
the potentially purposeful uses of law in ongoing conflict. This article has argued that the current 
state of the term's usage can at worst undermine the possible benefits of interested parties 
employing lawfare as an alternative or supplement to armed conflict for what we would consider 
goals with 'right' on their side, and at best muddy the water around discussions about the problems 
that contemporary ICL and its institution(s) face.  
 Not all applications of ICL are lawfare. In many cases, ICL is employed once a conflict 
has ended and the society is engaged in the difficult and necessary endeavour of rebuilding. 
International criminal law often has a significant role to play in serving justice, restoring faith in 
the domestic judicial system, and the promotion of human rights protection in a society ravaged 
by conflict and mass violations. However, when ICL is introduced in ongoing conflicts, it can have 
a unique constitution, as a form of conflict management strategy or an instrument of further 
polarization and stacking power unevenly behind one party. International criminal lawfare, under 
the right conditions, can be just and appropriate and should be supported by members of the 
international community as a means of protecting and promoting human rights globally. 
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 The moral responsibility of the international community can, and should, be met in a 
number of ways, including ensuring that states in conflict regard the Court as just and fair. This 
means that the international community should work to support the Court's ability to investigate 
and pursue indictments of all atrocity crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, regardless 
of which party to the conflict refers the case or has more power to support access for investigative 
purposes. This implies ensuring that all states wanting to have access to refer situations could do 
so without risking political reprisal, and ensuring that referrals by the international community's 
representative (UNSC) are, first, done justly and fairly, reflecting the worst or most deserving 
situations globally in which international crimes occurred, and, second, ensuring that like 
situations are treated in like manners. 
